Report: Donald Trump assassination attempt in Butler was ‘preventable’

WASHINGTON, D.C. — A failure to recognize a high-risk area including a rooftop within range of a presidential nominee’s stage. Insufficient guidance on who was responsible for what at an immense, boisterous rally. Heavy responsibility placed on Secret Service agents with little-to-no experience in advance planning. And a fragmented communication structure and technology breakdowns that let a gunman elude law enforcement and open fire — rocking an already heated election and taking a man’s life.

The bipartisan House task force on the assassination attempt on President-elect Donald Trump on July 13 at the Butler Farm Show grounds cited these and other severe, systemic failures in its final report released Tuesday.

The 180-page report, which is redacted to exclude personnel and other security issues and covers a second thwarted attempt on Trump’s life at a Florida golf course in September, paints a damning picture of Secret Service training, planning and operations after a nearly five-month investigation helmed by Reps. Mike Kelly, R-Butler, and Jason Crow, D-Colo.

“The task force found that the tragic and shocking events in Butler, Pennsylvania were preventable and should not have happened,” the report states. “There was not, however, a singular moment or decision that allowed (20-year-old Bethel Park gunman) Thomas Matthew Crooks to nearly assassinate the former president. The various failures in planning, execution and leadership on and before July 13, 2024, and the preexisting conditions that undermined the effectiveness of the human and material assets deployed that day, coalesced to create an environment in which the former president — and everyone at the campaign event — were exposed to grave danger.”

The most glaring concern noted by the task force aligns with what the acting Secret Service Director, Ronald Rowe, testified in an occasionally combative hearing last week: Despite close proximity to a main road, “clear sight lines to the stage and elevated position,” the Secret Service — the lead protective agency helping manage more than 100 state and local supporting law enforcement personnel — failed to secure the immediately adjacent American Glass Research grounds. This allowed an unscreened crowd to gather and let Crooks — who used drones to survey the area while the Secret Service did not — climb to a roof and fire a rifle eight times into the rally, injuring and nearly killing Trump, killing former firefighter Corey Comperatore and wounding attendees David Dutch and James Copenhaver.

That failure was compounded “by the fact that the area was not sufficiently monitored or patrolled to deter threats,” and the “Secret Service did not provide clear guidance to its state and local partners about which entity was responsible for the area,” the task force said.

But beyond the planning and operational failures on July 13 in Butler County, Kelly’s hometown, the task force said the Secret Service must address longstanding leadership and culture issues, including around training and preparing agents for protective work.

“There is a culture and practice of expecting on-the-job training to teach and prepare agents to fulfill critical roles like Security Room Lead and (protective intelligence advance),” the panel wrote. “Understanding that the operational tempo is strenuous, the Secret Service needs to prioritize periodic training on protective operations during times when agents are available, and such training should take priority over investigative activities that are unrelated to protective operations.”

The task force made nearly two-dozen recommendations to improve security and safety based on its findings from the Butler investigation, 11 of them focused on bolstering leadership, training and “agency resources to enhance the Secret Service’s capacity to fulfill its zero-fail protective mission.”

The recommendations include, among others: consolidating all operational plans; more vigilance when considering coverage inside and outside security perimeters; documenting all line of sight vulnerabilities; clearer written policies on asset and resource approval based on threats; implementing a formalized process for elevating security concerns; using counter-surveillance assets for all outdoor events; ensuring state and local law enforcement representatives are in a unified security room to improve the flow of information; reviewing budget, staffing and retention; and improved communication plans among the Secret Service and its partners.

The panel also suggested the Secret Service should consider separating from the Department of Homeland Security, and reducing its number of protectees, particularly as the U.N. General Assembly relies on the agency to protect foreign dignitaries — a job that could potentially “be transferred or abrogated in order to focus on the (agency’s) primary duty: to protect the president and other critical U.S. leaders.”

After investigating the West Palm Beach, Fla., golf course attempt on Sept. 15, the task force also recommended a review of protocols for sweeping golf courses in advance and increasing reliance on K9 sweeps. However, the 13-member panel said the “events that transpired” in Florida “demonstrated how properly executed protective measures can foil an attempted assassination.”

As Crow and Kelly told the Post-Gazette last week, the task force says the Department of Justice “withheld information ... related to ongoing investigations,’ specifically regarding the actions and motives of Crooks and Ryan Routh, the would-be assassin in Florida.

The FBI, whose role in the Butler investigation is focused on Crooks, disputed that characterization in a statement to the Post-Gazette last week, noting the agency “shared an incredibly large amount of detailed information with the House task force.”

This included “documentation of more than 80 interviews with members of the (Secret Service) and other law enforcement agencies who responded on July 13; 17 detailed and technical laboratory reports analyzing the bullets, IEDs, Crooks’ drone, DNA and other evidence; classified intelligence documents; records of communications with the (Secret Service) prior to the rally; photos of evidence; verified timeline based on evidence; dispatch log of 911 call from Crooks’ parents; autopsy evidence documents; and other documents.”

The FBI also provided many briefings, including a classified briefing about threat intelligence — the task force found that Iranian-linked threats never reached the right personnel at Butler — and a visit by task force members to see evidence and talk with experts at FBI’s Laboratory Division at Quantico.

The FBI provided the information while the investigation continues “because of the exceptional circumstances presented by the attempted assassination, marking an extraordinary accommodation, far beyond what the constitutionally-required accommodation process would mandate, because we took into account the national importance of these events,” the agency told the Post-Gazette.

But the task force says Congress and the American public deserve more answers on Crooks in particular, including greater details from his phone, communications and online activity and who he may have been interacting with prior to the shooting.

The task force recommended that Congress clarify its oversight role and the need to review records even when there is an active investigation by federal agencies.

“The relevant committees may also seek to address important questions that the task force did not fully examine,” the panel reported. “Foremost among them are the motivations of Thomas Crooks and Ryan Routh, which remain largely unknown. The American people (and in the case of Crooks, the victims and their families) deserve that information, and the task force expects the FBI, ATF, and DOJ to be more forthcoming in that regard going forward.”